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CASES
Courts Must Consider State Administrative
Findings in Determining Educational
Placement of Disabled Children
by Andrea L. Worrell
In Hartmann v. Loudoun
County Board of Education, 118
F.3d 996 (4th Cir. 1997), the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that when
determining what is proper educa-
tional policy for disabled children, a
court may neither reject nor disre-
gard findings developed from local
school authorities and state adminis-
trative proceedings when those
findings are supported by evidence
and the law. In reversing the district
court's decision, the court held that
even though the mainstreaming
provisions of the Individual With
Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 100 et seq.,
provides that disabled children
should be included in classes with
non-disabled children, this require-
ment is not an inflexible mandate,
and disabled children should be
included in regular classes only to
the extent that the child receives a
benefit. When deciding whether a
child receives a benefit from
inclusion, courts "do not have
authority to substitute their own
notions of sound educational policy
for those of local school authorities"
and state administrators who are in a
better position to observe a child's
educational progress.
School District Attempted to
Mainstream Autistic Child
into Regular Classes
Joseph and Roxanna Hartmann
filed suit on behalf of their autistic
son Mark against the
Loudoun County Board of
Education ("Board"). The
Hartmanns alleged that the Board
failed to educate their son Mark
according to the ("IDEA")
"mainstreaning" guidelines, which
called for educating disabled
children with non-disabled children
"to the maximum extent appropriate."
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
Mark Hartmann is an autistic
child. The Fourth Circuit described
autism as a "developmental disorder
characterized by significant defi-
ciencies in communication skills,
social interaction, and motor
control." Mark originally entered
elementary school in Illinois where
he spent half of his time in a
program for autistic children and the
other half in a regular education
classroom, assisted by a full-time
aide. When Mark and his family
moved to Loudoun County, Virginia,
Mark entered second grade at
Ashburn Elementary School but
could neither write nor speak.
Loudoun County school officials
placed Mark in a regular education
classroom with a teacher specially
trained in teaching autistic children.
Mark also received assistance from a
full time teacher's aide, who was
specially trained to help him. In
addition, Mark worked with a
specialist and a special education
teacher who provided him with one-
on-one speech and language therapy.
Mark's individualized education
program ("IEP") team further
included: Ashbum's principal, the
Loudoun County Director of Special
Education, special educational
consultants, and consultants referred
to the team by the Hartmanns, all of
whom collectively monitored Mark's
program and modified it according
to his needs and abilities.
Despite the IEP team's best
efforts, school officials found that
Mark was not progressing academi-
cally and that the team was unsuc-
cessful at managing Mark's behav-
ioral problems. Mark had daily
outbursts of disruptive behavior such
as "loud screeching... hitting,
pinching, kicking, biting and
removing his clothing." Mark's
teacher and aide spent time daily
calming Mark down while redirect-
ing the other students back to their
studies. Because of Mark's poor
academic performance and disrup-
tive behavior, the team proposed to
place Mark in a program specifically
designed for autistic children at
Leesburg Elementary School.
Leesburg was a regular elementary
school, and the autism program
there was designed to facilitate
interaction between disabled and
non-disabled children.
The Hartmanns rejected the
proposal to remove Mark from a
regular classroom, claiming it
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"failed to comply with the
mainstreaming provision of the
IDEA." In response, the Board
initiated due process proceedings to
obtain the approval necessary to
remove Mark from the regular
classroom. Subsequently, Mark
started 3rd grade at Ashburn
Elementary in a regular classroom.
The local hearing officer found in
favor of the Board and called for
enforcement of the proposal.
Specifically, the hearing officer
found that Mark made no academic
progress in the regular classroom
setting despite the county's "enthusi-
astic efforts," to accommodate him,
and that Mark's behavior was overly
disruptive to a class of non-disabled
children. Agreeing with the hearing
officer's findings and legal analysis,
a state review officer later affirmed
the local hearing officer's decision.
This affirmation prompted the
Hartmann's suit in federal court.
Meanwhile, Roxanna Hartmann
moved with Mark to Montgomery
County, Virginia, where she enrolled
Mark in a regular classroom. As a
preliminary matter, the court
rejected Loudoun County's conten-
tion that the Hartmanns did not
present a valid case or controversy
because Mark was enrolled in a class
acceptable to them. Since Mark and
his mother would return to Loudoun
County if Mark was permitted to re-
enroll in a regular classroom, the
court found the Hartmanns had
standing to bring this suit.
States in Better Position To
Assess Educational Policies
Reversing the hearing officer's
decision, the district court found in
favor of the Hartmanns. In reaching
its decision, the district court
dismissed the administrative
findings and concluded that Mark
had failed to progress academically
in a regular classroom because "the
Board simply did not take enough
appropriate steps to try to include
Mark in a regular class." Further,
since IDEA contains a strong
presumption for inclusion of
disabled children in regular class-
rooms, disruptive behavior should
not weigh significantly when
considering educational placement.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court, finding
that the district court incorrectly
based its decision on the court's own
interpretation of Mark's Illinois and
Montgomery County educational
experiences instead of relying on the
Loudoun County school official's
testimony. The court noted that even
though IDEA allows courts some
latitude in determining the educa-
tional plans of a disabled child,
courts cannot "substitute their own
notions of sound
educational policy for those of
the school authorities which they
review." Hartmann quoting
Board of Education of Hendrick
Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The
Fourth Circuit relied on Board of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) to support its position that
"federal courts cannot run local
schools" and that "local schools
deserve latitude" in determining
which program best suits a disabled
child.
In reaching this decision, the
Fourth Circuit noted, "[a]bsent some
statutory infraction, the task of
education belongs to the educators
who have been charged by society
with that critical task... [and]
federal courts must accord 'due
weight' to state administrative
proceedings." The Fourth Circuit
asserted, therefore, that it was not
the intention of IDEA to overrule an
educator's judgment regarding
educational policy, rather, it was to
ensure that a handicapped child
could receive some educational
benefit through state provided
special services. In this case, the
district court "strayed" from
established principles concerning the
proper role of federal courts in
determining educational policy.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit
noted that "[a]dministrative findings
in an IDEA case 'are entitled to be
considered prima facie correct."'
Hartmann quoting Doyle v. Arling-
ton County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100,
105 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Fourth Circuit also noted that
the district court failed to consider
DeVries v. Fairfax County School
Board, 882 E2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
Under DeVries, "mainstreaming is
not required where (1) the disabled
child would not receive an educa-
tional benefit from mainstreaming
into a regular class; (2) any marginal
benefit from mainstreaming would
be significantly outweighed by
benefits which could feasibly be
obtained only in a separate instruc-
tional setting; or (3) the disabled
child is a disruptive force in a
regular classroom setting." De Vries
E2d at 879.
Even though the district court did
not mention DeVries in its opinion,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
record in this case revealed that the
DeVries categories described Mark's
situation and should have been
considered by the district court.
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The Fourth Circuit further noted
that the district court's determination
that Mark received
substantial educational benefit in
the regular classroom was contrary
to the administrative
findings that Mark made no
academic progress in that setting.
Therefore, the district court's
decision to ignore the hearing
officer's evaluation, the Fourth
Circuit pointed out, went against the
legal principle that state proceedings
must command considerable
deference in federal court.
While the Fourth Circuit recog-
nized that the IDEA's mainstreaning
provision established a presumption
of inclusion, it found that presump-
tion ultimately subordinate to the
main goal that disabled children
receive some educational benefit.
Therefore, the findings of state
proceedings must be considered to
accurately assess what will confer
the best educational benefit on the
disabled child.
IDEA Does Not Guarantee
Maximum Benefits to the
Handicapped Child
In reaching its conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit realized that IDEA
requires disabled children to be
educated along with non-handi-
capped children "to the maximum
extent appropriate" but it does not
require a county to provide "every
special service necessary to maxi-
mize each handicapped child's
potential." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 199.
Similarly, the IDEA does not require
that every special education provider
possess "every conceivable creden-
tial relevant to evey child's disabil-
ity." It would be economically
unfeasible and equally unrealistic to
expect every school system to have
the highest accredited educators.
Using this reasoning, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed the dictrict court's
conclusions that county efforts were
insufficient to educate Mark in the
regular classroom due to inad-
equately trained personnel. The
Fourth Circuit deemed this theory
inconsistent with the law and with
the record. Premier credentials are
not required under IDEA and the
record revealed each of Mark's IEP
team members' credentials were at
least adequate.
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
held that since the state educational
facilities and not the court, are in the
best position to assess educational
policy, a court must give preference
to state administrative findings in
determinining the most appropriate
educational program. These findings
may include information which can
override the IDEA's mainstreaming
provision calling for the presump-
tion for inclusion. In addition, the
Fourth Circuit held that the IDEA
mainstreaming provision does not
require schools to provide a staff
possessing the most optimum of
credentials, or to provide the
absolute most beneficial program
for a "best case" scenario. In this
case, the Board satisfied the
mainstreaming directive of the
IDEA by its enthusiastic steps to
organize a qualified staff, and the
Board's active attempts to tailor a
program to fit Mark's needs.
Internet Service Providers Immune from
Liability for Third Party Defamation
by Lynn Middendorf
The Communications Decency
Act of 1996 ("CDA") protects
computer service providers from
liability for information that
originates from third parties. In
Zeran v.America Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), Kenneth
Zeran brought a negligence claim
against AOL for posting a false
message from a third party. The
Fourth Circuit, ruling that Section
230 immunizes computer service
providers from liability for publish-
ing information from third parties,
reaffirmed a judgment on the
pleadings.
On April 25, 1995, an unknown
person placed an advertisement on
an AOL bulletin board for "Naughty
Oklahoma T-shirts". The message
listed Kenneth Zeran's phone
number for inquiries. These T-shirts
alluded to the April 19, 1995
Oklahoma City bombing in a
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